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Investment in electricity generation infrastructure has been long lived because of its high lead 
times and high capital cost. In addition to its long-lived nature, the investment has also become 
riskier with the deregulated market structure and high electricity price volatility. The push towards 
building generators with flexible generation, low capital cost and low lead times has driven the 
investment towards natural gas fired generation resulting in large amount of capacity addition in 
the 2000s. Natural gas fired generation technologies have different economics compared to other 
technologies. In this study we find that as most of the cost of a natural gas power plant is the fuel 
cost and with natural gas being cheap, natural gas fired technologies pay back sooner than other 
technologies. Analysis of NGCT plants’ economics in six locations (New York City, Chicago, 
Houston, Long Island, Washington D.C. and Dunwood, NY), show that payback periods range 
from 9 to 17 years, depending on region the plant is operating in. This payback period is shorter 
than other generation technologies such as coal and nuclear. We also discuss how this high 
profitability and short payback period of NGCT power motivates investment in natural gas fired 
generation and the need policy to direct the investment towards cleaner generation technologies.  
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Electricity is one of the most versatile and consumed sources of fuel. In 2017, 28% of the 
residential, commercial and industrial final energy demand was satisfied by electricity and 38% of 
all the primary energy was used for electricity generation (LLNL 2018). As more sectors of 
economy, like transportation, get electrified the demand for electricity is bound to increase even 
more. The aging electricity infrastructure and push towards low carbon generation is attracting 
huge sums of investment in the electricity sector. 
Even in the past, Electricity generation infrastructure has attracted huge sums of investment. Most 
electricity generation infrastructure have high capital cost, high lead times and inflexible operation. 
This results in long payback period of the infrastructure which is spread out through most of the 
lifetime of these technologies. The payback period of a nuclear power plant is about 40 years 
including lead times (Kharitonov, V. V. et al. 2017) and that of an Integrated Gasification Combine 
Cycle (IGCC) coal fired power plant with CCS is about 22 years (Tola et al. 2014) excluding lead 
time which is 6-8 years (NETL 2010). Moreover, conventional generation technologies also 
require supporting infrastructure like coal mines, oil and gas fields and pipelines etc. which tend 
to have a longer lifetime than the generation infrastructure itself. The long lifetime of supporting 
infrastructure and slow payback of some generation assets makes electricity a long-lived 
investment.  
In addition to its long-lived nature, investment in electricity generation infrastructure has become 
riskier over the years as electricity markets have been restructured. In the regulated markets, the 
utilities would make large investments in high capacity infrastructure. As utilities were vertically 
integrated monopolies they controlled the price customers paid for electricity. This allowed the 
risks involved in investment in electricity generation infrastructure to be transferred to the 
customers in the form of increased price for electricity. It also decreased the risk of investment in 
electricity generation for the utilities and the financers. Utilities in turn received capital at a lower 
interest rates and made large investments in high capacity electricity generation infrastructure.   
Unlike in the vertically integrated market structure, the market risks have been internalized in the 
restructured markets as the costs can no longer be passed on to the consumers (OECD 2003). The 
percentage of renewable energy generation capacity is rapidly increasing. Increased penetration of 
renewable energy lowers the price of electricity as they have low marginal cost and pushes the 
base load generators with high marginal cost out of the market. Most of the generators with high 
marginal cost are conventional generators as the fuel to run them is expensive (Kirch 2018). This 
further elevates the risk related to investment in electricity infrastructure. Moreover, the electricity 
prices in a competitive market structure are more volatile. This volatility in the electricity prices is 
a risk for generators with low ramp rates like coal and nuclear generators as they cannot change 
the output as fast as the fluctuations in price.  
In recent years, natural gas has taken over coal as a major fuel for electricity generation. In 2017, 
32% of the electricity generated was using natural gas as compared to 30% using coal (EIA-
Electricity Explained 2017). By 2050 natural gas fired generation will contribute to 45% of the 
total generating capacity and 35% of the total generation (EIA-AEO 2018). The reason for this 
transition to natural gas from coal is that natural gas fired generation is economically and 
technically better than coal in the current market. Unlike coal and nuclear plants, natural gas 
generation technologies have lower capital cost and low lead times. This results in lower financing 
cost and the plants can start operating and generating revenue sooner. As the natural gas turbines 
have high ramp rates, natural gas power plants can operate flexibly and can alter the generation 
based on market signals more easily. This also lowers startup cost. Use of gas turbines in jet 
engines has led to accelerated technological innovation in turbine technology and substantially 
increased its efficiency (Hirsh 1999). In addition to this, cheap natural gas lowers the marginal 
cost of the generator and increases the overall profit as it can generate electricity at a lower cost 
and operate at higher capacity factors. Natural gas has become the non-renewable generation of 
choice since early 2000s. Investment in natural gas capacity has continued since then and it is 




FIGURE 1: Electricity generation capacity addition by technology in the united states from 2005 
to 2050 as represented in the Reference Case Scenario of Annual Energy Outlook-2018. Most of 
the capacity built in the 2000s was Natural Gas fired, and the trend is likely to continue with more 
natural gas fired capacity additions in the future. 
As investment in natural gas fired generation infrastructure increases, and more natural gas 
capacity is built, it will be one of the major, if not the only source of emissions from electricity 
generation in the future. This increases the likelihood of lock-in of carbon intense infrastructure 
for decades. Average age of power plants in the United States is about 30 years. According to EIA 
about 88% of the coal fired generation capacity operating as of December 2016 was built between 
1950 and 1990. Also, the capacity-weighted average age of coal fired capacity in operation was 
39 years. According to a study by (Pfeiffer et al. 2016), no new electricity generation infrastructure 
must be built after 2017, unless it is a replacement for older retiring infrastructure or is coupled 
with carbon capture technologies, to meet the emission targets. This estimate is under the 
assumption that other sectors of the economy meet their emission targets to limit global 
temperature increase to 2 degrees. Any investment in conventional electricity generation 
technologies today, drives us off the path to meet climate targets. Hence, there is a dire need to 
shorten the bridge between conventional generation and renewables and transition to low carbon 
generation sooner.  
 
FIGURE 2: Levelized cost of electricity generation of different technologies split into the 
individual components. It highlights the difference between economics of natural gas fired 
technologies and other conventional technologies. Variable O&M cost (which includes the fuel 
cost) account for majority of the cost of electricity from natural gas fired plants whereas, capital 
cost contributes to majority of the cost for other technologies. 
We believe that, as natural gas fired power plants have different economics compared to other 
technologies, not all investment in electricity generation is the same. Investment in natural gas 
combustion turbine (NGCT) power plants can be recovered sooner than other conventional 
electricity generation technologies. EIA publishes Levelized cost estimates as represented in the 
NEMS for Annual energy outlook. The distribution of cost over different components varies for 
different technologies. The natural gas fired technologies have relative lower capital cost but high 
variable cost. On the other hand, coal, nuclear and hydro have higher capital cost and lower 
variable cost and renewables have no variable cost. Natural gas plants have low capital cost, most 
of its cost is the fuel cost and they are flexible to operate. With natural gas being cheap and market 
mechanism tipping in favor of natural gas plants, they must be more profitable than almost any 
other generation technology.  
There is extensive literature about economic performance, profitability, payback of electricity 
generation technologies. Studies like Botterud et al. 2007 and Conzelmann et al. 2005 do complex 
modeling to simulate the electricity markets to predict future profitability and inform capacity 
expansion planning. But, in these studies there is not much emphasis on the historical performance 
of the plants. Other studies like Falode et al. 2016 calculate the NPV, IRR and payback of 
powerplants by making assumptions for capacity factors. This does not capture the demand supply 
dynamics and the price volatility of the competitive markets. A 200l study (LCC 2001) by LCC 
Consulting, estimated the contribution of revenue from ancillary services to the overall revenue of 
powerplants based on historical market data for one year but was not focused on estimating the 
payback period.  
Hence, to test the hypothesis, we built a model of a natural gas combustion turbine power plant 
operating in the US electricity markets to estimate the historical revenue the plant would have 
made using the market price data and other market operation data. Using the revenue calculated 
we estimate the payback period of a typical NGCT power plant and discuss its implications on 
future of investment in electricity generation. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
A NGCT powerplant, which is a peaker plant, can generate revenue from various streams in 
restructured markets. It can generate revenue by participating in the energy markets, providing 
ancillary services or in the form of capacity payments. We base our model on a NGCT power plant 
operating with perfect market information. It means that the plant has all the information it needs 
to determine which service is most profitable in any given hour and it will opt to provide that 
service. Following table shows the assumptions used to model the power plant. 
TABLE 1: Model assumptions for characteristics of Natural Gas Combustion Turbine Power 
Plant 
Characteristics of Model NGCT Power Plant 
Name Plate Capacity 50 MW Model Assumption 
Capital Cost 676 $/kW 
EIA 2010 Fixed O&M Cost 7.04 $/kW 
Variable O&M Cost 10.37 $/kWh 
Heat Rate 9.750 BTU/kWh EIA-EPA 2016 
Lifetime 40 years Model Assumption 
Minimum Operating Load 20 MW Model Assumption 
 
We use historical market operation data including, clearing prices, fuel costs and O&M cost to 
determine the profitability of providing different services in any given hour. Using the profitability 
information, we determine the best utilization of plant capacity to maximize overall profit in that 
hour. We assume that the plant can provide only one service in any given hour. To determine the 
profitability, we model the cost and revenue of participating in the energy market and providing 
different ancillary services in ERCOT, PJM and NYISO. To provide any of the services the ISOs 
carry out uniform price auctions where plants place their bids and depending on the demand for 
that service the market clearing point (which is the cost of the plant on the margin) determined. 
All the bids below the market clearing point are accepted and the plants are compensated 
accordingly. However, as different services have different market mechanisms and characteristice, 
we model each service separately and aggregate the hourly cost, revenue and profit for every year 
the plant is in operation. Using the annual cost, revenue and other information like capital cost we 
estimate the payback period of the plant.  
 
2.1 ENERGY MARKETS 
All the deregulated markets operate energy markets. The energy markets work on a fundamental 
principle which is to procure enough electricity supply to satisfy the demand at the least cost 
possible. The ISOs procure energy from generators based on their marginal cost of generation 
which generators bid as the cost of electricity. The ISO procure electricity from generators in 
increasing order of their marginal cost, i.e. ISO will buy cheapest electricity first (generators like 
coal, hydro, renewables) and most expensive electricity last (generators like natural gas, 
petroleum), until there is enough to satisfy the demand. Hence, higher the demand more is the 
price of electricity. Unless there is enough demand to get the price of electricity up to the marginal 
cost of a power plant that plant will not be able to generate and sell electricity.  
We use a methodology based on the above principal to model the energy markets in all the regions. 
If the locational marginal price of energy is higher than or equal to the marginal cost of the NGCT 
plant in a particular hour the power plant will generate and sell all of its electricity in the energy 
market if the locational marginal price is lower than the marginal cost the plant will participate in 
the ancillary services market and provide the most profitable service. We also assume that the plant 
is always a price taker and is never on the margin. Hence, whenever the plant is in operation it will 
operate at full capacity unless it is providing ancillary services. We assume energy market to be 
the base of the revenue stream and that the plant will always participate in energy markets when it 
is not making a loss. 
We estimate the marginal cost per MWh for every hour (operating cost) and every location using 
the equation 1. The marginal cost for each hour in a particular month is the same because the fuel 
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The annual revenue from energy markets is calculated using equation 2a which is based on the 
principal described above, and the variable cost is calculated using equation 2b. 
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2.2 ANCILLARY SERVICES  
All ISOs operate ancillary services markets in addition to energy markets to ensure reliable 
operation. FERC defines ancillary services as “those services necessary to support transmission of 
electric power from seller to purchaser, given obligations of control area and transmitting utilities 
within those control areas, to maintain reliable operations of the interconnected transmission 
system” (FERC 2016). It classifies the ancillary services into 6 main categories. Reactive power-
voltage regulation, system protective services, loss compensation services, system control, load 
dispatch services and energy imbalance services. In this model, we include only 2 of the above 
categories. Reactive power-voltage regulation which includes the regulation services (regulation 
up and regulation down in case of ERCOT) and energy imbalance services which include spinning 
and non-spinning reserves. Ancillary services contribute to a substantial portion of revenue for a 
peaker natural gas power plant. 
NYISO provides five ancillary services. Regulation, 10-min Spinning reserve, 10-min non-
spinning reserve, 30-min spinning reserve and 30-min non-synchronized reserve (NYISO-AS 
2018). ERCOT operates four ancillary services. They are called Responsive Reserves, Regulation-
up, Regulation-down, and Non-spinning reserves (ERCOT-AS 2010). PJM operates three 
ancillary services. They are Regulation, Synchronized Reserve and Primary Reserve. Depending 
on the ISO, the ancillary service operations are divided into zones within that region. NYISO 
divides the area into 3 zones, which are, West of Central-East, East of central east and long island 
(NYISO-AS 2018) for all ancillary services. All the area served by ERCOT is treated as a single 
zone for all ancillary services. Synchronized Reserve and Primary Reserve markets in PJM region 
are divided into two zones. The PJM territory and the PJM Mid Atlantic Dominion (MAD) Sub 
Zone. For the regulation market all of PJM region is considered as a single zone (PJM-AS 2018). 
As different ISOs have different ancillary services, we model the revenue for each individual ISO 
based on the market structure and locational data. Our model for ancillary services is based on the 
assumption that, when not serving the energy market, the plant will provide the most profitable 
ancillary service operated by the RTO in any given hour. We then aggregate the hourly revenue 
and variable cost for every year. We calculate the cost and the revenue of each ancillary service in 
a given hour using market data to calculate the profit and use it as a decision criterion to choose 
an ancillary service in that hour. 
2.2.1. NON-SPINNING RESERVES 
Non-spinning reserves which is also called as Non-synchronized reserves is a type of operating 
reserve service provided by generators which are off line. The generator does not have to be 
actively generating electricity but must be able to start operation and generate electricity in an 
amount of time specified by the ISO. The NYISO provides two types of non-spinning reserve 
services, the 10-min Non-spinning reserve and 30-min Non-synchronized reserve. ERCOT 
operates only one market for Non-spinning reserve services which is called Non-Spinning 
Reserves and so does PJM which is called Primary Reserve. 
If the plant chooses to provide Non-spinning reserve in any particular hour, in which case it will 
be the most profitable service in that hour, it will bid all of its capacity for that service. We calculate 
the revenue from Non-spinning reserve which is a product of the bid capacity and the Non-spinning 
reserve clearing price in that hour using equation 3a. As the plant does not have to generate to 
provide this service, the operating cost is minimal or close to zero. If the plant is called to provide 
electricity, it implies that the demand for electricity is high enough for the locational marginal 
price to be higher than the marginal cost of the power plant. In that case the plant will have 
participated in the energy market. In case of NYISO which operates two non spinning reserve 
services, we only account for the revenue from the service which has the highest clearing price in 
any given hour.  
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2.2.2. REGULATION 
Regulation services are operated to maintain the balance between supply and demand over a very 
short period of time (over few seconds). The plant has to change its output to match the Automated 
generation Control (AGC) signal provided by the ISO. To provide this service the generator has 
to be running at a certain capacity depending on the type of regulation market and change its output 
when required to do so. 
NYISO and PJM operate only one market for regulation which serves both regulation up and 
regulation down requirement. In this case, the model 50 MW powerplant can provide only 15 MW 
of regulation service. As the minimum operating load of the plant is 20 MW and as the plant can 
be called to provide either regulation up or regulation down, it has to operate at 35 MW so that it 
can ramp-up and provide 15 MW regulation up or ramp-down and provide 15 MW regulation 
down. In addition to providing regulation services, the plant sells the electricity generated by 
operating at 35 MW capacity in the energy markets which adds to the revenue from energy 
markets. The plant will generate electricity and sell it in the electricity markets even if it is losing 
money as long as the overall operation of providing regulation service is profitable. If the plant 
chooses to provide regulation service in any particular hour, we calculate the revenue in that hour 
for NYISO and PJM using equation 4a. The variable cost of providing regulation services is the 
cost of operating at 35MW and generating electricity while the plant is bidding for regulation and 
is calculated using equation 4b.  
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Unlike the NYISO and PJM, ERCOT operates two regulation markets, one for providing 
regulation up and other for providing regulation down. The plant has to either ramp down to 
provide regulation down or ramp up to provide regulation up. As the two markets are separated 
the plant can bid more capacity for regulation as it can be called to ramp only in one direction. In 
this case it can bid 30 MW. Hence, we model the two regulation services similar to regulation in 
NYISO but separately as the plant will be operating at different load depending on the service it 
has bid for. 
a) To model regulation down, we assume that the plant is operating at full capacity (50MW) 
and bidding for 30MW of regulation down. It can only bid 30MW of capacity into the 
regulation down market as it has to operate at a minimum operating load of 20 MW at all 
times. During this time, it is selling all of the electricity generated while operating at full 
capacity into the energy markets. We calculate the revenue and the cost of providing 
Regulation-Down in any particular hour using equation 4c and 4d. 
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b) To model regulation up, we assume that the plant is operating at minimum operating load 
(20MW) and bidding for 30 MW of regulation up service. During this time, it is selling all 
of the electricity generated while operating at minimum operating load into the energy 
market. We calculate the revenue and the cost of providing Regulation-Up in any particular 
hour using equation 4e and 4f. 
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2.2.3. SPINNING RESERVE 
Spinning reserve services are provided by generators which are running and are able to increase 
their output in a certain amount of time specified by the ISO which is generally lower than non-
spinning reserves and is about 10-15 minutes in most markets.  
NYISO calls its spinning reserves 10-Min Spinning Reserve, ERCOT calls it Responsive Reserve 
and PJM calls it Synchronized Reserve. Despite different names all of the services are 
fundamentally similar and hence we take the same approach to model them. To qualify for spinning 
reserve service, plant has to be operating at minimum load at all times. Hence, we assume that if 
the plant provides spinning reserves, it will be operating at 20 MW as it is the minimum load. It 
will bid the rest of the capacity which is 30MW in this case into the spinning reserve market. 
Similar to regulation services, the plant will generate electricity and sell it in the electricity markets 
even if it is losing money so long as the overall operation of providing spinning reserves is 
profitable. We calculate the revenue and the cost of providing spinning reserve service using 
equation 5a and 5b respectively. 
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2.3 CAPACITY PAYMENTS 
NYISO and PJM both operate capacity markets to ensure adequate generation capacity is available 
to satisfy the current and future demand at all times. Capacity markets are not only supposed to 
ensure short term resource adequacy but also aid capacity expansion and investment in new 
generation capacity. In the capacity markets, the load serving entities are either required to meet 
the capacity requirement set by the RTO by either supplying the capacity themselves or procuring 
it or the RTO procures the capacity and allocates the cost to the LSEs. The payments to generators 
to ensure they are available to operate when required, add to the revenue of a generator. 
NYISO operates a capacity market called Installed Capacity (ICAP) Market. The load serving 
entities (LSEs) in NYISO are required to fulfill their obligation to procure enough capacity to meet 
their minimum requirements. The capacity requirements for each LSE are calculated based on the 
forecasted peak demand it would have to serve in and an additional installed reserved margin. 
NYISO conducts auctions to facilitate LSEs to procure installed capacity from installed capacity 
suppliers. NYISO operates the ICAP market in two periods in a year, called the Summer Capability 
Period and the Winter Capability period. For each period, they conduct three auctions, the 
capability period auction (also called as the strip auction) which is no later than 30 days before the 
start of a capability period, the monthly auction which is conducted every month within a capability 
period, and the spot auction which is conducted at the start of each obligation procurement period 
(NYISO-CAP 2018). We use the strip auction clearing price data which is price for unit capacity 
per day for both the capability periods and aggregate it annually to calculate the annual capacity 
payments for 50MW generator. As the winter capability period is always split between two years 
as it goes from November of a particular year to April of next year, we also split the capacity 
payment accordingly depending on number of days in each year for which the auction prices apply.   
PJM ensures adequate generation capacity through two market structures which are based on 
Resource Pricing Model (RPM) and Fixed Resource Requirement (FRR). LSEs can opt for either 
of the two to ensure adequate generation capacity. However, the capacity markets in PJM are based 
on RPM. The RPM is used to determine the locational capacity pricing, variable resource 
requirement mechanism, forward commitment of supply and reliability backstop mechanism. 
RPM consist of a base residual auction and up to three incremental auctions after the base auction 
for each delivery year. The base residual auction is held in the month of May three years before 
the delivery year and the incremental auctions are held between the base residual auction and the 
delivery year (PJM-CAP 2018). The FRR alternative on the other hand requires LSEs to submit 
fixed resource capacity plan and meet the resource requirements. FRR alternative is more suitable 
for entities operating out of market and getting their revenue from out of market (e.g. through 
PPAs) and RMP is more suitable for entities participating in the competitive markets (e.g. market 
settlements) (Pfeifenberger et al. 2009). Since all of revenue of the NGCT plant in consideration 
is from competitive markets we consider capacity payments only through RPM. We use the base 
residual auction clearing price data for each delivery year which is price for unit capacity per day 
and aggregate it annually to calculate the annual capacity payments for a 50MW generator. A 
planning period in PJM is a 1-year period from June 1 of a particular year to May 31of the next 
year. Hence, we account for the capacity payments accordingly depending on number of days in a 
calendar year for which the auction prices apply. 
 
2.4 CALCULATING THE RATE OF PAYBACK 
We use the capital cost, fixed cost and variable O&M cost data for each region from Capital Cost 
Estimates for Utility Scale Electricity Generating Plants data by EIA. Using the model outputs and 
the EIA cost data we calculate the profit generated by the plant in each year. To calculate the 
annual loan payments, we assume the that all of capital cost is a one-time inflow of cash. The 
capital cost has to be paid back with interest over the lifetime of the plant. We assume that the loan 
is the overnight capital cost of the plant which grows at 6.97% per year (compounded annually) 
(FRB 2017). All of the profit generated is directed towards paying back the capital cost of the 
plant. If the plant makes a profit after paying off the nominal loan payment, the principle 
diminishes faster than the nominal duration of the loan based on amortized loan calculation, if the 
plant makes a loss the principle diminishes slower. 
We extrapolate the annual outstanding principal and estimate the breakeven point where the 
outstanding principal is zero.  
3. DATA SOURCES 
TABLE 2: Sources of data used as inputs to the model 
Variable  ISO Data Source Time Horizon 
Locational Clearing Price 
electricity  
NYISO NYIOS-RTP n.d. 
 
2007-2016 
Ancillary service market 
price 
NYISO-RTAS n.d.  2007-2016 
Capacity payments NYISO-ICAP n.d.  2007-2016 
Natural gas price EIA-NG-NY n.d.  2007-2016 
Locational Clearing Price 
electricity  
PJM PJM-RT n.d.  2007-2017 
Ancillary service market 
price 
PJM-RTAS n.d. 2012-2017 
Capacity payments PJM-CPM, n.d. 2007-2017 
Natural gas price EIA-NG-DC n.d. 2007-2017 
EIA-NG-IL n.d. 
Locational Clearing Price 
electricity  
ERCOT ERCOT-RT n.d. 
 
2012-2017 





Capacity payments No Capacity Market - 
Natural gas price EIA-NG-TX n.d. 
  
2012-2017 
Cost Data (Capital cost, 
variable O&M cost, fixed 
cost, location correction) 
 EIA 2010 2007,2012 
Interest Rate  FRB 2017   2007, 2012 
 
4. RESULTS 
The model calculates hourly revenues from providing energy and ancillary services and aggregates 
them annually. Figure 3 shows sample of NGCT powerplant operations and the hourly revenue 
from Energy, Non-spinning Reserves, Spinning Reserves and Regulation for ten days in March 
2016 for PJM. It also shows the hourly energy clearing price during that time. The hourly revenue 
and the cost for each service is aggregated annually to yield results shown in figure 4. 
 
FIGURE 3: Sample model output showing hourly revenue from energy, non-spinning reserve, 
spinning reserve, and regulation and hourly clearing price for ten days in March 2016 for PJM 
Table 3 shows the utilization of a NGCT power plant operating in Washington DC as estimated 
by the model. Due to lack of data for earlier years in PJM the model does not estimate the 
utilization of the plant for ancillary services. As an NGCT power plant is a peaker plant, it is off-
line for most of the time. When the plant is in operation it participates in the energy market for 
most of the time follow by regulation and spinning reserve. Other regions also show similar 
utilization of the power plant.  
TABLE 3: Utilization of the NGCT plant in PJM-Washington DC for various services represented 




spinning Reserves (% 
of hours in a year) 
Energy 
(% of hours 
in a year) 
Spinning 
Reserve (% of 
hours in a year) 
Regulation 
(% of hours 
in a year) 
Capacity 
Factor (%) 
2007 76.3 23.7 - - 23.7 
2008 83.4 16.6 - - 16.6 
2009 90.8 9.2 - - 9.2 
2010 82.4 17.6 - - 17.6 
2011 87.8 12.2 - - 12.2 
2012 85.1 11.0 1.6 2.4 13.3 
2013 81.3 8.8 1.9 8.0 15.2 
2014 70.4 17.2 2.0 10.3 25.3 
2015 56.7 21.5 6.0 15.8 35.0 
2016 62.7 22.2 4.7 10.4 31.4 
2017 66.3 25.5 3.0 5.2 30.4 
 
As shown in figure 4, variable cost accounts for most of the plants’ cost. As most of the variable 
cost is fuel cost, the variable cost was considerably higher when natural gas was expensive during 
around 2007 and as natural gas became cheaper the variable cost decreased considerably. Other 
costs include fixed O&M cost which is constant over the years and capital cost which is a 
significant amount and is varies with location and terms of loan. 
Energy markets contribute to the majority of the revenue generated by the NGCT power plant, 
followed by ancillary service markets and capacity markets (if available). This trend is consistent 
across all the regions. The energy market on an average is more profitable than ancillary services 
markets. The revenue from ancillary services in NYISO has significantly decreased over the years 
and the capacity payments have increased. In PJM however, there is not a lot of variation. ERCOT 
does not run capacity markets. But, the revenue to cost ratio of the energy market in ERCOT is 
significantly higher compared to other ISOs. Because electricity prices are higher in ERCOT, the 
plant earns more from the energy markets.  
 
FIGURE 4: Cash flow of 50MW Natural Gas Combustion Turbine power plant operating in 
different markets. It shows the revenue from capacity, energy and ancillary services markets as 
positive values, and the fixed O&M cost, variable cost and capital cost payment as negative values 
and the profit in each year. It shows that in each of the market the revenue from energy markets 
and variable cost, most of which is fuel cost, constitute the major portion of the total revenue and 
total cost respectively. 
Another common trend observed in most markets analyzed is high revenue from energy in 2008 
and 2014, a dip in profit in 2009 and a peak in profit in 2014. The revenue from energy markets is 
high both in 2008 and 2014 which implies high peak electricity demand. However, the Henry Hub 
Natural Gas price in 2008 was 8.86 $ per million BTU as opposed to 4.37 $ per million BTU in 
2014 (EIA-NG n.d.). This difference in fuel price explains the high profit in 2014 compared to 
2008 despite high revenue. On the other hand, the natural gas price in 2009 was 3.94 $ per million 
BTU which is lower than that in 2014 (EIA-NG n.d.). The profit in 2009 should have been 
comparable to that in 2014. But it was not the case because low demand for electricity due to 
economic recession did not increase the price of electricity enough to benefit NGCT plants. Hence, 
both high peak electricity demand and low natural gas prices are crucial for profitability of NGCT 
power plants. 
 
FIGURE 4: Rate of payback of capital for plants operating in different regions and the cumulative 
surplus cash after the plant has paid back its capital investment. The rate of pay back depends on 
the region the plant operates in and most locations have payback period between 9-17 years which 
is lower than other technologies. The dots in the time series represent the separation between 
historical data and forecast.  
The rate at which the capital can be paid back depends on the cost and revenue of the powerplant 
which depend on the location the plant is operating in. As figure 4 shows, the payback of capital 
cost follows a linear trend which implies consistent profitability but the rate at which the capital is 
paid back differs with the region. The plants in NYC-NYISO, Washington-PJM and Houston pay 
back the capital cost in a short 9 to 17 years’ timeframe. Because of high peak demand in NYC-
NYISO and Washington-PJM the plant can participate in the energy market more often, operate 
at a higher capacity factor and because of cheap fuel price it can earn more profit. In Houston the 
high payback is a result of low capital cost in addition to high electricity prices. The high energy 
prices compensate for the lack of capacity markets in Houston-ERCOT to some extent. The plants 
operating in Chicago-PJM does not seem to be profitable. The low profitability can be attributed 
to low revenue from energy markets.  
Most companies which own power generation assets have multiple assets in different locations. 
The plants considered for analysis in this study can be thought of as one of the many portfolio of 
assets owned by a company. Investment in plants in NYC and Washington, DC were less risky 
part of the portfolio and performed well whereas, investment in Chicago was a more riskier part 
of the portfolio and performed poorly. Aggregating the performance of the individual assets to 
estimate the performance of the portfolio shows the payback period of the portfolio to be about 15 
years and average profitability of 38% over 10 years. For reference, the yield of a 10 year U.S. 
treasury bond is 2.8% which shows that investment in NGCT power plants is highly profitable.  
Hence, it can be concluded that investment in NGCT powerplant can be recovered sooner because 
of the lower capital cost, low fuel cost and the revenue generated from energy, ancillary service 
and capacity markets. Also, consistent profitability indicates that the investment is comparatively 
less risky than other generation technologies.  
5. PAYBACK PERIOD IN CHICAGO-COMED 
Since Washington, DC and Chicago both are a part if PJM, comparing the economics of both the 
locations might help understand the huge difference in profitability and payback period. The major 
reason for low profitability of plants operating in the Chicago area is the low revenue from the 
energy market. In 2016, the total generation in Chicago-COMED was 129,371 GWh when the load 
was 98,002 GWh. On the other hand, the total generation in PEPCO was 10,135 GWh when the 
load was 30,339 GWh. The 2017 Quarterly State of the Market report from PJM attributes the low 
revenue to reliability requirements enforced by external regulatory authority which requires a 
certain level of installed capacity (PJM-SOM 2017). According to the report, these requirements 
result in excess generation capacity compared to the demand and lower the locational marginal 
prices and eventually the revenue. As COMED has higher generation than the demand unlike 
PEPCO, these requirements affect the plants in the COMED area significantly compared to 
PEPCO.  
In addition to the reliability requirements the high transmission congestion in the PEPCO area 
increases the locational marginal prices and hence the revenue, whereas the relatively congestion 
free transmission in the COMED area keeps the locational marginal prices low. In 2016 the load 
weighted average locational marginal price in COMED was $ 27.66 which had a congestion 
component of -$0.51 whereas that in PEPCO was $34.12 and had a congestion component of 
$4.11. Both the regions had similar energy component to locational marginal price, which was 
$29.11 in COMED and $29.42 in PEPCO (PJM-SOM 2017). Hence the low congestion in the 
COMED region and the excess generation capacity result in low revenue and low profitability of 
plants in COMED area. Building transmission infrastructure to transmit the electricity from 
COMED to high demand areas or increasing the capacity payments to plants in the COMED area 
might help the plants offset the losses and become profitable.   
6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Figure 5 shows the sensitivity of various modeling assumptions (parameters) like Capital Cost, 
Heat Rate, Variable Cost, Fixed Cost and the Minimum Operating Load. The model results are 
most sensitive to the Capital Cost. Changes in capital cost have significant effect on the payback 
period of the power plant. Increase in Capital Cost lengthens the payback period more than the 
same amount of decrease in Capital Cost shortens it. This is because with high capital cost, there 
is less profit and the capital cost diminishes slower and vice versa. Hence increase in capital cost 
has a bigger effect on the payback than decrease in capital cost. The second most important 
parameter is the heat rate of the plant. Heat rate affects the efficiency of the powerplant and hence 
the fuel consumption. As fuel cost accounts for the major cost of the powerplant, the overall profit 
is sensitive to the heat rate of the plant and so is the payback period. Other parameters like fixed 
cost and minimum operating load have little effect on the payback period. 
 
FIGURE 5: Sensitivity of the model to the modeling assumptions. The payback period of the 
NGCT power plant is most sensitive to Capital Cost and the Heat Rate of the power plant. 
Figure 6 shows the uncertainty in the assumptions of values of various modeling assumptions and 
their effect on the modeling results. The range for each variable is estimated using the different 
values for each parameter appearing in various literature (Capital Cost- NREL n.d., Heat Rate- 
NETL n.d., Fixed Cost and Variable Cost- Lazard 2017, Minimum Operating Load- Hentschel 
2016). Capital cost has a wide range of estimates. That coupled with the high sensitivity of the 
model to capital cost makes it one of the critical parameters having the most effect on the results. 
Other parameters despite having high uncertainty in estimates like the fixed cost does not have a 
strong effect on the results because it contributes to a very small portion of the total cost of the 
power plant. Hence, Capital Cost and Heat Rate assumptions are the most crucial to the model and 
have a significant effect on the results.  
 
FIGURE 6: Uncertainty in assumption of parameters and its effect on the payback period. 
Uncertainty in the capital cost assumptions is the biggest source of variation in the modeling 
results.  
7. DISCUSSION 
Natural gas fired generation is favored by investors because, in addition to having low lead times 
and low capital cost, cheap fuel also makes these plants cheaper to operate and hence highly 
profitable. The high profitability of these plants lowers the payback period and accelerates the 
recovery of invested capital. In absence of an economy wide climate and energy policy, there is a 
lot of uncertainty around the future of electricity generation. The balance between cheap fossil fuel 
fired infrastructure and expensive renewable infrastructure to meet the greenhouse gas emission 
targets is unclear. This may lead to overinvestment in renewable infrastructure which might be 
under used or underinvestment leading to above threshold carbon emissions (Morris et al. 2018). 
Such uncertainty calls for short term planning to make it easier to adapt to the ever-changing 
energy policy and electricity grid. As the short payback period and high profitability of NGCT 
power plants allows investors to plan for the short term, it has motivated continued investment in 
natural gas fired generation. 
On the other hand, the quickly recovered capital investment from natural gas can be used to 
accelerate the transition to a cleaner grid. With effective policy measures, the capital can be 
diverted for other investment may it be new NGCT plants or other technologies like storage. New 
NGCT power plants can replace the oil powered power plants which have considerably higher 
emissions or large-scale electricity storage can complement renewables and provide ancillary 
services. In its current state large-scale energy storage is not economically and technically viable 
to be deployed at utility level. However, a Green Tech Media study shows that storage will be 
economically at par with NGCT plants in about five years and more profitable than NGCT in ten 
years (Manghani 2018). As more natural gas plants breakeven, investors will have a choice to 
reinvest the freed capital in modern technologies like storage increasing the possibility of 
investment in low carbon technologies. Even the investment in natural gas plant today will be 
recovered in 9 to 17 years when low carbon technologies will be ready to be scaled up. 
Implementing effective policy measures to direct the investment towards cleaner technologies can 
help accelerate decarbonization of the electricity grid.  
NGCT power plants will continue to be more profitable and pay back sooner than most other 
generation technologies as long as the fuel is cheap and there are no policies to cut the emissions 
form these plants further. However, the future of electricity generation is uncertain, with 
penetration of renewables and, social and policy push towards decarbonizing the grid. As natural 
gas will be one of the major sources of fossil fuel powered generation and hence greenhouse gas 
emissions in the future, there is bound to be some policy mandate like fuel taxes or greenhouse gas 
emissions performance standards which will adversely affect the economics of these power plants. 
Moreover, battery electricity storage when deployed at a large scale will decrease the peak demand 
and hence decrease the revenue and profitability of NGCT plants. When future policies, 
regulations and competing generation technologies are deployed, these plants will either have to 
adapt to bear the increased cost of meeting the policies and regulations and keep running with a 
pay cut or will be phased out of the market. In either case, as these plants are highly profitable and 
most of them will have paid off, it will not be as hard a hit to the investors as it otherwise would 
have been. 
If the current investment trends continue, natural gas fired generation will be the only if not the 
major source of emissions in the future. As long as the fuel is cheap and there is high peak demand, 
natural gas fire generation will be profitable. Although the high profitability and short payback 
period motivated continued investment in natural gas fired generation, it can be used to accelerate 
the transition to renewables and decarbonize the electricity grid with effective policy measures. 
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9. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
 
FIGURE 7: Cash flow of 50MW Natural Gas Combustion Turbine power plant operating in PJM-
COMED, NYISO-Long Island, NYISO-Dunwood. It shows the revenue from capacity, energy and 
ancillary services markets as positive values, and the fixed O&M cost, variable cost and capital 
cost payment as negative values and the profit in each year. It shows that in each of the market the 
revenue from energy markets and variable cost, most of which is fuel cost, constitute the major 
portion of the total revenue and total cost respectively. 
TABLE 4: Utilization of the NCGT plant in NYISO-NYC for various services represented as 




Reserves (% of hours in 
a year) 
Energy 
(% of hours in a 
year) 
Spinning Reserve (% of 
hours in a year) 
Regulation (% 
of hours in a 
year) 
2007 53.3 14.7 0.1 31.9 
2008 66.2 13.4 0.6 19.8 
2009 79.9 8.7 0.3 11.2 
2010 81.0 11.9 1.3 5.8 
2011 87.4 8.9 2.0 1.7 
2012 86.7 7.5 5.1 0.7 
2013 83.0 12.1 4.1 0.8 
2014 81.1 14.3 3.5 1.1 
2015 81.6 13.5 2.8 2.1 
2016 86.9 8.8 2.9 1.4 
 
TABLE 5: Utilization of the NCGT plant in NYISO-Long Island for various services represented 




Reserves (% of hours in 
a year) 
Energy 
(% of hours in a 
year) 
Spinning Reserve (% 
of hours in a year) 
Regulation (% of 
hours in a year) 
2007 37.9 23.7 0.0 38.4 
2008 49.0 22.8 0.4 27.9 
2009 67.0 15.6 0.2 17.3 
2010 71.6 20.8 1.0 6.6 
2011 79.3 16.8 1.7 2.2 
2012 79.0 15.8 4.4 0.9 
2013 71.7 23.5 3.8 0.9 
2014 75.0 20.5 3.1 1.4 
2015 73.8 21.3 2.5 2.3 
2016 80.7 15.2 2.4 1.7 
 
TABLE 6: Utilization of the NCGT plant in NYISO-Dunwood for various services represented as 





(% of hours in a 
year) 
Energy 
(% of hours in a 
year) 
Spinning Reserve 
(% of hours in a 
year) 
Regulation (% of 
hours in a year) 
2007 53.34 14.70 0.08 31.87 
2008 66.20 13.44 0.59 19.76 
2009 79.85 8.65 0.25 11.24 
2010 80.96 11.93 1.31 5.80 
2011 87.35 8.89 2.03 1.72 
2012 86.75 7.49 5.10 0.66 
2013 83.03 12.12 4.09 0.76 
2014 81.08 14.35 3.48 1.08 
2015 81.58 13.48 2.84 2.10 
2016 86.92 8.78 2.88 1.42 
 
TABLE 7: Utilization of the NCGT plant in PJM-Chicago for various services represented as 




spinning Reserves (% 
of hours in a year) 
Energy 
(% of hours in a 
year) 
Spinning Reserve 
(% of hours in a 
year) 
Regulation (% of 
hours in a year) 
2007 89.53 10.47 
  
2008 94.19 5.81 
  
2009 96.66 3.34 
  
2010 93.47 6.53 
  
2011 93.01 6.99 
  
2012 89.74 7.43 0.02 2.80 
2013 86.78 3.73 0.72 8.77 
2014 84.92 5.81 1.83 7.44 
2015 78.34 8.39 5.14 8.13 
2016 79.78 8.42 5.32 6.48 
2017 83.80 4.41 4.20 7.59 
 
TABLE 8: Utilization of the NCGT plant in ERCOT-Houston for various services represented as 





Reserves (% of 
hours in a year) 
Energy 
(% of hours 
in a year) 
Spinning 
Reserve (% 
of hours in a 
year) 
Regulation-
Up (% of 
hours in a 
year) 
Regulation-
Down (% of 
hours in a year) 
2010 89.8 2.8 2.0 5.4 0.0 
2011 86.3 6.6 3.4 3.5 0.1 
2012 85.7 4.0 9.1 1.1 0.1 
2013 82.6 4.9 11.0 1.2 0.2 
2014 79.8 7.3 9.6 1.5 1.8 
2015 86.4 4.5 7.3 0.8 0.9 
2016 74.9 5.2 17.9 1.0 0.9 
2017 73.9 7.0 15.0 2.9 1.3 
 
